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Using a networked, agent-based computational model 
of a stylized community, we evaluated thresholds for re-
scinding 2 community mitigation strategies after an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic. We ended child sequestering or all-community 
sequestering when illness incidence waned to thresholds of 
0, 1, 2, or 3 cases in 7 days in 2 levels of pandemic sever-
ity. An unmitigated epidemic or strategy continuation for the 
epidemic duration served as control scenarios. The 0-case 
per 7-day rescinding threshold was comparable to the con-
tinuation strategy on infection and illness rates but reduced 
the number of days strategies would be needed by 6% to 
32% in mild or severe pandemics. If cases recurred, strat-
egies were resumed at a predeﬁ  ned 10-case trigger, and 
epidemic recurrence was thwarted. Strategies were most 
effective when used with high compliance and when com-
bined with stringent rescinding thresholds. The need for 
strategies implemented for control of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
was reduced, without increasing illness rates.
C
ommunity goals during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic include 
protecting people from illness and maintaining critical 
societal functions by limiting time away from usual occu-
pations. Vaccine and antiviral medications are standards of 
inﬂ  uenza prevention, postexposure prophylaxis, and treat-
ment (1). However, vaccine for a new inﬂ  uenza subtype 
may not begin to be available for at least 20 weeks after 
the onset of a pandemic and would be supplied over many 
months. Antiviral drugs may be in greater supply, but their 
effectiveness and rapid availability are uncertain (2,3). The 
US government has proposed community mitigation strate-
gies for limiting the harm or managing the pace of an in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemic until vaccine becomes available. These 
behavioral- and pharmaceutical-based strategies rely on 
reducing viral transmission and include dismissing schools 
and public gatherings, voluntary sequestering in the home, 
staggering work shifts, keeping symptomatic persons iso-
lated, and treating ill persons rapidly with antiviral drugs 
and providing antiviral prophylaxis for their household 
contacts. These community mitigation strategies would be 
applied according to a pandemic severity index (PSI) scaled 
as categories 1–5. Category 5 would be a 1918-like event 
(case-fatality rate >2.0%) and category 1 (case-fatality rate 
<0.1%) would be akin to a bad seasonal inﬂ  uenza year 
(3). Modeling studies have estimated the effectiveness of 
mitigation strategies with and without vaccine and antiviral 
drugs (4–8). However, an independent review of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza modeling studies raised the question of whether 
and when community containment strategies might safely 
be rescinded without reinitiating an epidemic (9).
An earlier study of this computational model demon-
strated that closing schools and curtailing contacts of chil-
dren and teenagers for the duration of a mild 1957-like 
epidemic in a stylized community reduced the number of 
infected persons by >90% (10). The model was constructed 
with assumptions that children and teenagers are responsible 
for inﬂ  uenza transmission in a community because of the 
frequency and nature of their person-to-person contacts (11). 
However, sensitivity analyses showed that permutations of 
mitigation strategies that included adults were effective at 
reducing infections in the model population, even for more 
highly infective 1918-like viral strains or with removal of 
enhanced children/teenagers’ role in transmission (10). Sev-
eral studies have shown that combining strategies such as 
social distancing of adult groups in and outside the work-
place and removing symptomatic persons from community 
contact substantially reduced infections except in epidemics 
caused by the most infectious viral strains (4–10).
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The US government’s community mitigation guid-
ance recommends rapid initiation of strategies, then up to 
4 weeks of school closure for a PSI 2–3 pandemic and 12 
weeks for a PSI 4–5 pandemic. However, this guidance 
fails to address the gap between 12 weeks of mitigation 
strategies and estimated vaccine availability beginning at 
20 weeks, especially if antiviral drugs were of limited ef-
fectiveness or availability (3). A pandemic could recur in 
the intervening period, and nonpharmaceutical commu-
nity mitigation strategies with rules for their use would be 
valuable tools. Although nonpharmaceutical community 
mitigation measures have been used with apparent success 
in past pandemics (12,13), there are concerns about unin-
tended consequences such as economic losses, interruption 
of education, and restrictions of personal freedom (9). The 
potential impact of community mitigation strategies war-
rants further study and consideration.
We evaluated effects of rescinding 2 community miti-
gation strategies for inﬂ  uenza pandemics, seeking a bal-
ance of the effect of illness, risk for epidemic recurrence, 
and minimization of the duration of mitigation strategies. 
The 2 strategies bracket mitigation measures that might be 
logically used in a situation in which effective vaccine and 
antiviral drugs are not available. The strategies are child 
sequestering, which is included in the US community miti-
gation guidance of February 2007, and a most conserva-
tive measure of all-community sequestering. We instituted 
strategies early, after 10 cases of mild (1957-like, PSI 1–2) 
or severe (1918-like, PSI 4–5) pandemic inﬂ  uenza occurred 
in a stylized community; these strategies were rescinded 
according to incident cases within a speciﬁ  c period.
Methods
The model used in this study has been described (10). 
Brieﬂ  y, it is a networked, agent-based computational mod-
el, Loki-Infect, developed at the National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center, a collaborative center of 
Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National 
Laboratories. Our model application simulates an inﬂ  uenza 
epidemic in a community of 10,000 populated according 
to the age breakdown of the 2000 US Census for a small 
US community (14). The community consists of 17.7% 
children 0–11 years of age, 11.3% teenagers 12–18 years 
of age, 58.5% adults 19–64 years of age, and 12.5% older 
adults >65 years of age.
The social contact network within the model deter-
mines how persons are linked so that transmission of inﬂ  u-
enza and its consequences may occur. Persons are placed in 
multiple groups that reﬂ  ect their roles and functions within 
the larger social network. Groups include household set-
tings (older adults, adults, teenagers, and children), school 
settings (teenagers, children), work settings (adults), and 
community settings (older adults, adults, teenagers, and 
children). Persons are further assigned to within-age group 
interactions to reﬂ   ect routinely occurring social gather-
ings such as clubs and meetings. Within groups, persons 
are linked through an average number of person-to-person 
contact(s) per day on the basis of observations of behavior 
and activities of group members (10). Random links and 
contacts are built into the model to reﬂ  ect unscheduled 
events such as chance face-to-face encounters.
Within the social contact network, each person in the 
community occupies 1 of 7 positions in the natural history 
of inﬂ  uenza (uninfected, latent infection, infectious pres-
ymptomatic, infectious symptomatic [20% circulating in 
the community, 80% diagnosed and staying home], infec-
tious asymptomatic, immune, or dead). We also include 
an eighth position, a noninfectious recovery period (mean 
7 days) for diagnosed persons to reﬂ  ect expected illness 
caused by a pandemic strain. Opportunities for transmis-
sion within the network are selected stochastically and de-
pend on multiple parameters, including infectivity of the 
virus, position of the person in the natural history of inﬂ  u-
enza, susceptibility of the person being infected, and in-
fectiousness of the transmitting persons (10). Probabilities 
of progression through the natural history of inﬂ  uenza and 
susceptibilities follow current understanding of inﬂ  uenza 
infection, and reﬂ  ect recent work of Ferguson et al. (4,5). 
When diagnosed and staying home, a person reduces con-
tact frequency with all nonhousehold groups by a compli-
ance level.
The 2 community mitigation strategies modeled were 
school closings with home sequestering of children and 
teenagers <18 years of age (hereafter called child seques-
tering) and home sequestering of all community members 
(hereafter called community sequestering). Child seques-
tering reduces contact frequencies for children and teenag-
ers in school and all nonhousehold settings by a compliance 
level and doubles within-household contacts of children 
and teenagers. During child sequestering, 1 household adult 
stays home in households with children <11 years of age 
where they similarly adjust their group contact frequencies. 
Community sequestering reduces all nonhousehold contacts 
of all community members by a level of compliance and 
doubles within-household contacts. We considered compli-
ance levels from 50% to 90% in increments of 10%. Adult 
days at home are a measure of the effect of the mitigation 
strategy and are counted as number of days adults are either 
sick at home, taking care of children, or sequestered them-
selves. Adult days at home in community sequestering are 
adjusted by compliance to reﬂ  ect the percentage of time 
spent outside the home on a daily basis while the strategy 
is imposed.
Scenarios begin by infecting 10 adults chosen at ran-
dom. Strategies are imposed after 10 persons within the 
community receive a diagnosis of inﬂ  uenza and end when 
366  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 14, No. 3, March 2008Rescinding Strategies in an Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic
the epidemic slows to the point that 0, 1, 2, or 3 newly diag-
nosed cases occur in 7 days (≈2 generation times of inﬂ  uen-
za [5]). Strategies are reimplemented if 10 new cases occur 
and are rescinded at the designated rescinding threshold. 
Control scenarios are an unmitigated base case (epidemics 
without mitigation strategies implemented) or continuation 
of strategies for the epidemic duration (child sequestering 
or community sequestering implemented at the 10–diag-
nosed case trigger and ended when the last incident case is 
recovered or dead).
We designed epidemic severity as a function of case-
fatality rate and viral infectivity. We assumed a case-fatal-
ity rate of 2% of those with clinical illness. We applied 2 
viral infectivities (ID) to yield 50% and 70% infection rates 
in the stylized community. Infection is deﬁ  ned as persons 
with viral infection with or without clinical illness. (Clini-
cal illness rates are 50% of infection rates.) The 2 IDs result 
in reproduction numbers (R0, or the number of secondary 
cases produced by a source case in a susceptible popula-
tion [15]) of ≈1.6 and 2.0, respectively. Thus, when the 
case-fatality rate is factored on 2 IDs, simulations yielded 
epidemics of 2 severities. The mild scenario resulted in a 
1957-like epidemic classiﬁ  ed by the US PSI as category 
1–2. The severe scenario yielded a 1918-like epidemic of 
PSI 4–5 (3,4,10,16).
To capture the real-world heterogeneity of communi-
ties experiencing an epidemic, each scenario was simulated 
in 100 statistically identical networks of the community; 
each epidemic then propagated through the community 
stochastically. We include data only from simulations that 
resulted in epidemics (deﬁ  ned as >100 infected persons 
or 1% of the population). We report infection rates to em-
phasize that asymptomatic persons play a role in inﬂ  uenza 
transmission. We also report peak illness rates to quantify 
the effect of illness on the community. The Table lists study 
outcome measures and community epidemic management 
targets from the literature and our estimations of tolerable 
epidemic impact to the community (17).
Results
We provide scenario outcomes for mild (online Ap-
pendix Table 1, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/con-
tent/14/3/365-appT1.htm) and severe (online Appendix 
Table 2, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/14/3/
365-appT2.htm) epidemics that compare the unmitigated 
base case, continuation strategies, and rescinding thresh-
olds of 0, 1, 2, or 3 cases in 7 days (hereafter rescinding 
thresholds assume cases/7 days). Results are displayed for 
50%–90% compliance in 10% increments. We also provide 
epidemic curves for mild (Figure 1) and severe (Figure 2) 
epidemics beginning with unmitigated epidemics, then with 
rescinding thresholds under varying conditions, and ending 
with continuation strategy plots. Both mitigation strategies 
(child sequestering and community sequestering) are plot-
ted on each graph.
Unmitigated Base Case
In the mild, unmitigated base case epidemic, an aver-
age of 8.4% (840 cases) of the population was ill at peak. 
The combination of a mild epidemic and lack of strategy 
imposition meant that the average number of days adults 
spent at home either sick or tending sick children was 2 
(range 0.4–2.4) over the course of the pandemic. In the se-
vere epidemic, an average of 17.0% (1,700 cases) of the 
population was ill at peak, and adults spent an average of 
3 (range 2.9–3.4) days at home (online Appendix Table 
2). Unmitigated base case epidemics showed a rapid on-
set, early peak (≈day 23 for mild or day 27 for severe) and 
resolution (most by day 100 for mild and day 80 for severe) 
(Figures 1, 2).
Continuation of Strategies for the Epidemic Duration
Addition of mitigation strategies reduced peak illness 
rates (approximately an order of magnitude; Figures 1, 2). 
When child sequestering or community sequestering was 
continued until the last case was recovered or dead (con-
tinuation strategies), each equally controlled mild epidem-
ics. For severe epidemics, infection and peak illness rates 
were higher for child sequestering than for community 
sequestering (peak illness rates were 1.4% [140 cases] for 
child sequestering and 0.7% [70 cases] for community se-
questering at 90% compliance) (online Appendix Tables 
1, 2). Although each strategy reduced the peak illness rate 
by >90% from the unmitigated base cases, in severe epi-
demics, child sequestering did not meet epidemic control 
targets for infection rate and peak clinical illness attack 
rate; community sequestering was required to meet these 
targets (Table, online Appendix Tables 1, 2). In contrast to 
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Table. Epidemic management targets 
Outcome Target
No. epidemics*/1,070 simulations  Fewer than unmitigated base cases 
Infection rate  <0.1 of population (n = 1,000) 
Peak illness rate  <0.01 of population (n = 100) 
Average no. cycles required  <2.0
Average days home per adult  Fewer than continuation strategies 
Average no. days strategies imposed  Fewer than continuation strategies 
*An epidemic is defined in the model as a simulation with a clinical illness rate >1% of the population. RESEARCH
the unmitigated base cases, adults were at home for longer 
periods with continuation strategies (12 days [mild] and 28 
days [severe] for child sequestering; 43 days [mild] and 63 
days [severe] for community sequestering; at 90% compli-
ance) (online Appendix Tables 1, 2).
Rescinding Thresholds
Adding rescinding thresholds as a component of miti-
gation strategies resulted in several beneﬁ  cial effects, inﬂ  u-
enced by whether a conservative or lax threshold was used 
and whether strategies were reinstituted if cases recurred. 
We assume 90% compliance with strategies; effects of 
lower compliance are considered in the next section.
Use of a 3-case threshold but not reinstituting strate-
gies at the 10 new case trigger (Figures 1, 2) delayed the 
full epidemic by interjecting a preliminary period and peak 
where the epidemic is controlled by the mitigation strategy. 
After rescinding, a second 10-fold higher peak occurred 
(especially if child sequestering was used) and total illness 
attack rates approached those of the base case (Figures 1, 2). 
In comparison, by reinstituting cycles at the 10-case trigger 
even with the lax 3-case threshold, peak illness rates were 
dramatically ﬂ  attened (to <100 cases for mild and gener-
ally <200 cases for severe epidemics), and the epidemic 
duration was lengthened because of the on-off cycling of 
mitigation strategies (Figures 1, 2). The 3-case threshold 
required an average of 3.2 (mild; community sequestering) 
to 5.8 cycles (mild; child sequestering) (Figures 1, 2, online 
Appendix Tables 1, 2).
The 0-case threshold was comparable to continuation 
strategies in controlling infection and peak illness rates 
(online Appendix Tables 1, 2, Figures 1, 2); <1.1 strategy 
cycles were needed to achieve control for both mild and 
severe epidemics. Infection and peak illness rates increased 
as the rescinding threshold was relaxed to 1, 2, or 3 cases 
(online Appendix Tables 1, 2). The 0-case threshold de-
creased duration of epidemics when compared with the 
3-case threshold. For example, in a severe epidemic, the 
maximum epidemic represented by these sample plots last-
ed 286 days with a 3-case threshold versus 169 days with 
a 0-case threshold (Figures 1, 2). Adult days at home in a 
mild epidemic were decreased from the continuation strat-
egy by 25% (12 days to 9 days) for child sequestering and 
by 33% (43 days to 29 days) for community sequestering, 
both with the 0-case threshold. For a severe epidemic, adult 
days at home for child sequestering decreased less (28 to 
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Figure 1. Mild epidemic (no. illness cases in a community of 
10,000 by day) using 10 randomly selected simulations from 
100 conducted for each scenario. Top panel shows unmitigated 
base case epidemic curves. Remaining panels show child 
sequestering strategy (dark lines) and community sequestering 
strategy (light lines). Each mitigation strategy is implemented at 
90% compliance. (Note change in y-axis scale.)Rescinding Strategies in an Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic
27 days) with the continuation strategy than with commu-
nity sequestering (63 to 49 days). Relaxing the rescinding 
threshold generally increased the number of adult days at 
home often above the continuation strategy (online Appen-
dix Tables 1, 2). Recurrence of epidemics was a function of 
rescinding threshold; an average of only 1/10 epidemics re-
curred for the 0-case threshold versus 10/10 for the 3-case 
threshold (for both mild and severe epidemics).
Role of Compliance
Compliance with imposed child sequestering or com-
munity sequestering could be <90% because of persons 
who provide essential community services, other needs 
for persons to circulate in the community, or fatigue with 
the strategy. Figures 3 and 4 compare infection rates and 
strategy time across the rescinding thresholds and levels of 
compliance.
For the control continuation strategies, reducing com-
pliance with child sequestering or community sequester-
ing eroded effectiveness in preventing epidemics and also 
affected infection and peak illness rates. For severe epi-
demics, high compliance was critical to epidemic control. 
When compliance decreased from 90% to 50%, infection 
rates tripled for child sequestering (from 17% to 56%) 
and increased 10-fold for community sequestering (5% to 
50%) (online Appendix Tables 1, 2). In contrast, because 
low compliance enabled the epidemic to pass through the 
community more quickly (infecting susceptible persons 
rapidly), adult days at home were fewer than at higher com-
pliance (e.g., adult days at home in community sequester-
ing were 51 days at 50% compliance and 63 days at 90% 
compliance (online Appendix Tables 1, 2).
When rescinded at the 0-case threshold with 80%–
90% strategy compliance, fewest days of strategies were 
needed (online Appendix Tables 1, 2, Figures 3, 4). How-
ever, for severe epidemics, lower compliance (50%–70%) 
and the 0-case threshold used more strategy time than less 
restrictive ending case thresholds. Infection and peak ill-
ness rates showed little variation. In a severe epidemic with 
community sequestering implemented at 50% compliance, 
the infection rate was 50% with the 0-case threshold with 
86 days of the strategy compared with an infection rate of 
51% with the 3-case threshold with 71 days of strategy (on-
line Appendix Tables 1, 2). The model shows this result 
because once half the population is infected (and there-
fore immune), the epidemic R0 of 2.0 has effectively been 
halved. With fewer persons to infect at the end of the epi-
demic, use of the more conservative rescinding threshold 
has no effect on ultimate infection rates, requires additional 
days of strategy, and thus increases adult days at home.
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Figure 2. Severe epidemic (no. illness cases in a community of 
10,000 by day) using 10 randomly selected simulations from 
100 conducted for each scenario. Top panel shows unmitigated 
base case epidemic curves. Remaining panels show child 
sequestering strategy (dark lines) and community sequestering 
strategy (light lines). Each mitigation strategy is implemented at 
90% compliance. (Note change in y-axis scale.)RESEARCH
Discussion
We examined whether it was possible to safely rescind 
child sequestering and community sequestering in a wan-
ing mild (PSI 1–2) or severe (PSI 4–5) epidemic by using 
0, 1, 2, or 3 new cases in 7 days as a threshold. Deﬁ  ned 
epidemic management targets reﬂ  ected community goals 
aimed at 1) minimizing infection and peak illness rates 
(to reduce illness cases, transmission opportunities, and 
to limit healthcare surge); 2) minimizing days adults were 
kept from their usual occupations (to enable community 
functions to continue); and 3) minimizing local epidemic 
duration (to enable all community members to return to 
usual activities). Community mitigation strategies such as 
child sequestering and community sequestering may help 
achieve these goals. Ideally, strategies should be used for 
the minimum time necessary.
When modeled with the highest compliance and rein-
stitution of strategies in the event of epidemic recurrence, a 
rescinding threshold of 0 cases applied as a component of 
community sequestering contained PSI 1–2 or 4–5 epidem-
ics with fewest days of mitigation strategy needed. Peak 
illness rates did not exceed 1% of the population and infec-
tion rates were <10%. The 0-case threshold applied as a 
component of child sequestering in severe epidemics did 
not control as well, but still substantially reduced infection 
and illness rates and shortened the number of days adults 
were required to be home and days strategies were used 
compared with continuing the strategies for the epidemic 
duration.
When less conservative rescinding thresholds of 1, 2, 
or 3 cases were used (strategies applied with high compli-
ance), epidemic recurrences required multiple reinstitution 
of cycles, ultimately yielding marked increases in cases, 
number of adult days at home, and epidemic duration. Re-
ducing compliance increased infection rates, peak illness 
rates, and adult days at home, and required duration of strat-
egies. For severe epidemics and low compliance, epidem-
ics were only marginally suppressed. Thus, relaxing ending 
thresholds to 3 cases did not add to the effect of illness and 
ultimately cost fewer days of strategies. These ﬁ  ndings in-
dicate that low compliance cannot be compensated for by 
a restrictive rescinding threshold. High compliance is the 
necessary enabler of successful mitigation strategies (not 
the rescinding threshold).
Reinstitution of strategies in the event of epidemic 
recurrence was necessary to prevent near base case levels 
of illness. Such reinstitution will be a critical action in an 
epidemic resurgence or in the event of a multiwave pan-
demic. The 1918 pandemic consisted of an apparent spring-
time herald wave followed by severe fall-winter waves, and 
a series of secondary waves lasting into 1920. Historical 
studies of the 1918 pandemic demonstrated that earlier ini-
tiation and longer duration of nonpharmaceutical measures 
were associated with lower peak and total death rates in US 
cities (12,13,18). However, pandemic-affected cities that 
instituted, then abandoned, mitigation strategies had more 
illness cases in subsequent pandemic waves (because more 
susceptible persons remained in the population), which 
points to the need to plan for and follow stringent rules for 
reinstitution of measures.
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Figure 3. Infection rates and duration of strategy in mild epidemics 
by level of compliance for child sequestering and community 
sequestering, and rescinding threshold (Cont, 0, 1, 2, or 3). Cont, 
strategy continuation for the duration of the epidemic. Rescinding Strategies in an Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic
The social contact network used for this study was 
constructed to represent a small community in which 
complexity of person-to-person transmission can be rep-
resented in detail. Once within a community, inﬂ  uenza 
transmission takes place in the subnetworks simulated 
by this model, such as workplace, school groups, house-
holds, and neighborhoods. A larger population, such as a 
city, could be best modeled as a set of communities that 
are in contact through interactions in the work environment 
or through random interactions in shops or other settings. 
Mathematically, our model and results apply to such a situ-
ation where subnetworks in each community are similar, 
the epidemic is equivalently initiated in each, and identical 
mitigation strategies are applied with equivalent thresholds 
and compliances. Results then apply equally to single and 
large composite communities; rescinding thresholds should 
most conservatively be applied at the scale of the compos-
ite community.
The need to formulate regionally based policies for 
school closings has been suggested (19). For comparison, 
we simulated epidemics in which neighboring communi-
ties were not practicing the same community mitigation 
strategies. In these unmitigated regional simulations, work-
place contacts were replaced by random contacts from a 
fully mixed reservoir of adults from neighboring commu-
nities doing nothing to abate the epidemic. When com-
pared with mitigated regional epidemic scenarios, in mild 
or severe epidemics with child sequestering implemented, 
peak illness rates doubled and tripled, respectively. How-
ever, child sequestering still decreased illness attack rates 
by >75% from base cases. Community sequestering was a 
more effective strategy in unmitigated regional scenarios 
for mild and severe epidemics, keeping peak symptomatic 
cases equivalent to the mitigated regional scenarios, but it 
lost effectiveness with decreasing compliance. Thus, with-
out regional practice of strategies, effectiveness was less, 
but the direction of effects was the same.
A recent US Institute of Medicine report properly de-
scribes modeling as a simpliﬁ  cation of reality (9). The styl-
ized community we modeled exempliﬁ  es that description. 
However, modeling is a useful way to explore ramiﬁ  cations 
of policy. This study outlines potential approaches for re-
opening schools and workplaces in a waning epidemic, but 
also points to additional resources required to apply them. 
Clear case deﬁ  nitions, diagnostic criteria, and availability 
of diagnostic tests would clarify strategy initiation triggers. 
Accurate community surveillance would be necessary to 
count cases and determine when a rescinding threshold had 
been reached and when measures might need to be rein-
stituted. Initiation and rescinding of community mitigation 
strategies could seem frustratingly complex to an unpre-
pared public, pointing to the need for clear messaging and 
information dissemination about rationale and potential ef-
fectiveness of all mitigation measures.
Epidemic modelers and public health experts propose 
that community mitigation measures might help communi-
ties limit pandemic effects. Nonpharmaceutical, behavior-
based measures could be critically important in the inter-
val between availability of vaccine and arrival of antiviral 
medications. Our study builds on previous studies that 
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Figure 4. Infection rates and duration of strategy in severe epidemics 
by level of compliance for child sequestering and community 
sequestering, and rescinding threshold (Cont, 0, 1, 2, or 3). Cont, 
strategy continuation for the duration of the epidemic.RESEARCH
examined timing and effectiveness of initiation of nonphar-
maceutical pandemic mitigation measures by examining 
thresholds for rescinding them. We found that measures 
might be strategically applied and rescinded without the ef-
fect of additional illness and with savings of societal costs 
in terms of restriction of usual activities.
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